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DUE PROCESS-FIRST AMENDMENT-REPRESENTATION OF VET-
ERANS BEFORE THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION- Walters, Admin-
istrator of Veterans' Affairs v. National Association of Radia-
tion Survivors,' A tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its
victims may be the most oppresive.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Individual service in the armed forces was recognized by
Congress from the inception of the United States as an act mer-
iting compensation3 even after the completion of a term of ser-
vice. Congress first provided pensions for veterans in 1789," and
1. 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985).
2. "Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be
the most oppressive." Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDI-
CATAE 224, 228 (1952) quoted in Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 n.24 (2d Cir.
1977)(deprivation of the liberty interest in family privacy by municipal child welfare
authorities was purportedly in the "best interests" of the children).
3. "In 1958 the body of law relating to benefits for veterans and their dependents was
revised and codified as title 38 of the United States Code." 38 U.S.C.A. v (West 1979).
See 38 U.S.C.A. TABLES (West 1979) for list of the various federal laws replaced by
title 38. Veterans benefits in 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-5228 include: compensation for service-
connected death or disability, 38 U.S.C.A §§ 301-322; peacetime disability compensation,
id. §§ 331-342; general compensation, id. §§ 351-362; dependency and indemnity com-
pensation for service-connected deaths, id. §§ 401-423; pension for non-service connected
disability or death or for service, id. §§ 501-543; insurance, id. §§ 701-788; hospital, nurs-
ing home, domiciliary and medical care, id. §§ 601-654.
4. Legal protection for veterans' rights is not a novel idea in Anglo-American history.
See, e.g., MAGNA CARTA:
Article II: If any of our earls or barons or others holding of us in chief by knight
service dies, and at his death his heir be of full age and owe relief he shall have
his inheritance on payment of the old relief, namely the heir or heirs of an earl
£100 for a whole earl's barony, the heir or heirs of a baron £100 for a whole
barony, the heir or heirs of a knight 100s, at most, for a whole knight's fee; and
he who owes less shall give less according to the ancient use of fiefs. ...
Article XVI: No one shall be compelled to do greater service for a knight's
fee or for any other free holding than is due from it. ...
Article LXI: Since, moreover, for God and the betterment of our kingdom
and for the better allaying of the discord that has arisen between us and our
barons we have granted all these things aforesaid, wishing them to enjoy the use
of them unimpaired and unshaken for ever, we give and grant them the under-
written security, namely, the barons shall choose any twenty-five barons of the
kingdom they wish, who must with all their might observe, hold and cause to be
observed, the peace and liberties which we have granted and confirmed to them
by this present charter of ours, so that if we, or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or
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continued to provide some form of benefits after every subse-
quent conflict in national history. In 1792 Congress prohibited
the "sale, transfer, or mortgage" of a veteran's pension.6 In the
words of Abraham Lincoln, Congress has "provided for him who
has borne the battle, and his widow and his orphan."17
The Veterans Administration (VA), created by Congress in
1930,8 is empowered to disburse veterans benefits. Veterans are
allowed to make claims to the VA for all service related injuries
and disabilities. As long as the veteran (or veteran's widow, or
estate) can establish a relationship9 between the injury, disabil-
ity or death, and time served in the armed forces, the VA will
determine the benefit, under the statutes and regulations, to
which the claimant is entitled. In applying for benefits, and in-
voking the congressional machinery for determining whether
award of benefits is justified, a claimant may hire an agent, rep-
resentative, or attorney for assistance.10 Under the present stat-
utes, however, a claimant for veterans' benefits may pay that
representative a maximum of only ten dollars." The fee-limita-
any one of our servants offend in any way against anyone or transgress any of
the articles of the peace or the security and the offense be notified to four of the
aforesaid twenty-five barons, those four barons shall come to us, or to our justi-
ciar if we are out of the kingdom, and, laying bare the transgression before us,
shall petition us to have that transgression corrected without delay.
7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRIT. 674-76 (1985).
5. Id. See 38 U.S.C.A. v ("Explanation"), XXXI (Table 2: America's Wars) for a list
of numbers of participants, deaths, and living veterans and dependents on pension rolls
(e.g., the last veteran of the Civil War died on August 2, 1956 at the age of 109).
6. Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 245. Waiters, 105 S. Ct. at 3190.
7. 105 S. Ct. at 3183.
8. 38 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1979) (Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 863, § 1, 46 Stat. 1016) and
Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3183.
9. This case arose because the VA found no relationship between plaintiffs' claimed
injuries and service in the armed forces.
10. 38 U.S.C.A. § 3404 (West 1979):
(a) The Administrator may recognize any individual as an agent or attorney
for the preparation, presentation and prosecution of claims under the laws ad-
ministered by the Veterans' Administration, and ...
(c) The Administrator shall determine and pay fees to agents or attorneys
.. . such fees (2) shall not exceed $10.00 with respect to any one claim; and (3)
shall be deducted from monetary benefits claimed and allowed.
See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 3401 (West 1979) (requiring recognition by the Administrator
to act as an attorney or agent) and 38 C.F.R. § 14.634 (1986).
11. 38 U.S.C.A. § 3404(c). National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F.
Supp. 1302, 1323 n.20 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The original fee was $5.00 in 1862, but was sub-
sequently raised to $10.00 in 1864 and has since remained unchanged. It was enacted "to
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tion imposed upon the claimant is backed by criminal sanc-
tions,"2 and is directed against the agent, representative, or at-
torney who accepts more than the statutorily limited fee. This
has been the law since 1864."3 Veterans' organizations presently
exist to assist the claimant pro bono"' but they receive no remu-
neration from a claimant by law. 5
protect veterans from extortionate fees," Smith v. United States, 83 F.2d 631, 640 (8th
Cir. 1936); Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 173 (1920). Justice Stevens's dissent in Wal-
ters finds this concern unconvincing today: "I find the fee-limitation unwise and an in-
sult to the legal profession." Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3213. "As a profession lawyers are
skilled communicators dedicated to the service of their clients." Id. at 3212.
12. Whoever (1) directly or indirectly solicits, contracts for, charges, or receives,
or attempts to solicit, contract for, charge, or receive, any fee or compensation
except as provided in sections 3404 or 784 of this title, or (2) wrongfully with-
holds from any claimant or beneficiary any part of a benefit or claim allowed and
due him, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned at hard labor for not
more than two years or both.
38 U.S.C.A. § 3405 (West 1976)
13. Section 6. And be it further enacted, that the fees of agents and attorneys for
making out and causing to be executed the papers necessary to establish a claim
for a pension, bounty, and other allowance, before the Pension Office under this
act, shall not exceed the following rates: For making out and causing to be duly
executed a declaration by the applicant, with the necessary affidavits, and
forewarding the same to the Pension Office, with the requisite correspondence,
five dollars. In cases where additional testimony is required. . .for each affidavit
so required and executed and forewarded. . .one dollar and fifty cents.
Section 7. And be it further enacted, that any agent or attorney who shall,
directly or indirectly, demand or receive any greater compensation for his ser-
vices under this act than as prescribed in the preceeding section of this act, or
who shall contract or agree ...on the condition that he shall receive a per
centum. . . shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof shall, for every such offense, be fined not exceeding three hundred dol-
lars, or imprisoned at hard labor not exceeding two years, or both.
Act of July 14, 1862, 12 Stat. 568.
Section 12. And be it further enacted, that the fees of agents and attorneys
for making out and causing to be executed the papers necessary to establish a
claim for a pension, bounty, and other allowance before the Pension Office under
this act, shall not excced ...ten dollars; which sum shall be received by such
agent or attorney in full for all services.
Act of July 14, 1864, 12 Stat. 389.
14. 38 U.S.C.A. § 3402 (West 1976). Various veterans' organizations exist to assist
claimants, e.g., Veterans of Foreign Wars, American Legion, Vietnam Veterans of
America, American G.I. Forum, American Veterans Committee, and National Associa-
tion of Atomic Veterans. Disabled American Veterans (DAV) was the sole organization
which assists veterans with VA claims to file an amicus brief for the appellants.
15. Id. at § 3402(b)(1). Most of the service organization representatives are not attor-
neys. The representatives receive no payment from the claimants, and claimants who
utilize service representatives are precluded from obtaining attorneys. See 38 C.F.R. §
14.626 (1985), infra note 70. Notwithstanding the services the organizational representa-
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Plaintiffs' challenge to the fee-limitation statute as a depri-
vation of due process under the fifth amendment and as a viola-
tion of their first amendment rights was rejected by the Su-
preme Court.' The Supreme Court applied a method of
review, 7 also enacted by Congress in the 1930s, to review di-
rectly the nationwide preliminary injunction ordered by Judge
Patel of the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, which restrained enforcement of the fee-
limitation."
Plaintiffs did not assert a right to have the VA assign them
counsel, only the right to hire their own attorney, and to pay
that attorney more than the statutorily prescribed ten dollar fee,
especially in complex cases. The preliminary injunction issued
by the district court was to remain in effect only until the com-
pletion of a trial on the merits.'9 In deciding defendants' appeal
of the district court order, the Supreme Court not only reversed
the preliminary injunction, but also decided plaintiffs' case on
the merits.2 0
tives provide for simple cases, plaintiffs established to the district court's satisfaction the
need for attorneys to present complex claims before the VA.
16. 105 S. Ct. at 3196-97.
17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(1) (West 1964), infra note 101. See also Heckler v. Ed-
wards, 465 U.S. 870 (1984); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982);
McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947).
18. See National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302 (N. D.
Cal. 1984).
19. Id. at 1329.
20. 105 S. Ct. at 3188, 3199-209 (Brennan, J., concurring). It is unclear if in the fu-
ture all injunctions against federal statutes, or federal action controlled by statutes, are
appealable directly to the Supreme Court. Six justices agreed with the jurisdictional
finding; four would vacate the injunction and remand for further findings; three found
the fee-limitation unconstitutional, and four found it constitutional. One question re-
mains: What kind of discovery is possible in a complex case for ten dollars? Previous
cases attacking the fee-limitation statute involved attorneys trying to collect more than
the legal fee, Hines v. Lowry, 305 U.S. 85 (1938); Margolin v. United States, 269 U.S. 93
(1925); Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170 (1920), and were thus distinguishable from vet-
erans asserting the right to pay more than the legal fee. A recent case challenging the
fee-limitation on first amendment grounds was remanded twice by an appeals court va-
cating the district court's decision upholding the statute, and thus had no precedential
value on the district court here. Staub v. Roudebush, 424 F. Supp. 1346 (D.D.C. 1976),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Staub v. Johnson, 574 F. 2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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II. FACTS
The plaintiffs were two veterans' organizations and several
individual veterans. Each individual plaintiff presented claims
before the VA,2 and each was unable to obtain representation
because of the fee-limitation statute. The two veterans' organi-
zations were the National Association of Radiation Survivors
(NARS), and the Swords to Plowshares Veterans Rights Organi-
zation (Swords to Plowshares). NARS represents veterans who
were involved in atomic bomb testing,2 and Swords to Plow-
shares concentrates on representing Vietnam War veterans.2
Four individuals joined these organizations as plaintiffs. Al-
bert Maxwell was discharged from the Army in 1947 with a fifty
percent disability.2 4 Between 1948 and 1968 four of the five chil-
dren born to his wife died in infancy from rare congenital dis-
eases.2 5 Maxwell was diagnosed as suffering form multiple my-
eloma in 1981.26 In denying Maxwell an upgrade of his disability,
the VA found no relation between his medical condition and his
Army service.2 7 Maxwell was inducted into the Army in 1940, at
the age of twenty-one. Stationed in the Philippines, he was one
of only 5,000 soldiers (out of 22,000) to survive the Bataan death
march. As a Prisoner of War (POW), he survived a Dostoyev-
skean 2  death sentence before a firing squad and was shipped to
21. Plaintiffs included individuals making new claims or alleging a diminution of
benefits, and organizations representing such individuals. The Court refused to make a
distinction between the claimants in the present case. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3189 n.8.
22. See H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS: AMERICAN VICTIMS OF NUCLEAR EXPERI-
MENTS (1980) (for individual accounts of peacetime soldiers and nuclear testing in Ne-
vada and the South Pacific).
23. For an overview see R. EISENBERG, VETERANS COMPENSATION: AN AMERICAN SCAN-
DAL (1985) and F. WILCOX, WHEN YOU CAN'T SUE THE GOVERNMENT THAT KILLS YOU,
WAITING FOR AN ARMY TO DIE: THE TRAGEDY OF AGENT ORANGE, at 98 (1983).
24. Brief for the National Association of Atomic Veterans, as Amicus Curiae In Sup-
port of Appellees, at 2-4, Walters (No. 84-571).
25. Id. at 3. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302,
1306 (N.D.Cal. 1985).
26. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 24 at 4.
27. Id.
28. In 1849, Dostoyevsky was arrested for the act of reading publicly a letter which
politically criticized Nikolai Gogol. This was a capital crime "according to the Legal
Code of 1845, which strictly forbade any organized political discussion." F. DOSTOYEVSKY,
THE VILLAGE OF STEPANCHIKOVO 11 (I. Avsey trans. Angel, 1983). Dostoyevsky was im-
prisoned and condemned to death by firing squad. The sentence was commuted at the
last moment while he was in front of the firing squad. He was then exiled to Siberia. Id.
1986]
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Japan with 1100 other POWs. Maxwell's boat was torpedoed
leaving only 52 survivors. Imprisoned near Hiroshima, Maxwell
and other POWs were utilized by their captors as laborers to
clear debris after the atomic bomb was dropped. Maxwell
worked in Hiroshima with his bare hands, drinking and eating
contaminated food, and shortly thereafter developed cold welts,
blisters and rashes.
Plaintiff Reason Warehime e was assigned to Nagasaki
clean-up duty. Wanting to make a career of the Army, he re-
mained "in uniform" and was assigned to atomic bomb testing
duty. In 1953 he was 2,000 to 3,000 yards from an Arizona test
blast whereupon he was ordered to leave his position in a trench
and march toward ground zero.30
Plaintiff Doris Wilson's husband,' and now-deceased plain-
tiff Dan Cordray, were aboard ships observing the testing of nu-
clear weapons in the South Pacific. Cordray was on the "highly
contaminated 3 2 USS Fulton for three months. He died before
this case was decided. 33
All plaintiffs, as individuals or as organizations, contend
that their inability to retain adequate counsel of their choice ad-
and see also F. DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 746 (C. Garnett trans. W.W.
Norton 1976), and biographies of Fyodor Dostoyevsky.
29. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 24 at 4.
30. At that time the United States was interested in gathering information about the
behavior of infantry during nuclear war. Complaint for Declarative and Injunctive Relief,
Appendix at 23, Walters (No. 84-571). The troops "were actually located in the stem of
the mushroom cloud that resulted from the blast." Brief For The National Association of
Atomic Veterans, As Amicus Curiae In Support of Appellees, at 4. The troops were "sur-
rounded by a dense fog of radioactive fallout and became nauseous." Id. at 5. The indi-
viduals involved now suffer from osteoporosis, sterility, cataracts, and lung cancer
caused, they allege, by participation in the atomic bomb testing. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. at 6 n.3. The USS Fulton moved into the nuclear test area immediately after a
test to recover scientific material on target ships. Id. See also Ellis & Blair, Bikini- A
Way of Life Lost, 169 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 813, 819 (1986)(smiling naval seamen swab a
target ship, "within hours of a blast," in a photograph credited to the U.S. Navy/ Nat'l
Archives). See also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSERVATION AND POWER OF THE H. COMM.
ON ENERGY COMMERCE, 99TH CONG. 2D SESS., AMERICAN NUCLEAR GUINEA PIGS: THREE
DECADES OF RADIATION EXPERIMENTS ON U.S. CITIZENS 45-57 (Comm. Print 1986)(For a
description of the planned radiation exposure of B-57B aircrews in the mushroom clouds
of nuclear bombs detonated in the Pacific in the 1950s; 5 different planes made 27 passes
through the cloud "from 20 to 78 minutes after detonation.").
33. See Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1306 n.3 and Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3198.
[Vol. IV
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versely affected the outcome of their claim.34
Arguing that the fee-limitation statute was both an uncon-
stitutional denial of procedural due process under the fifth
amendment to the Constitution and a denial of first amenment
rights to petition for redress of grievances, 5 plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the enforcement of the fee-limitation.3 6 Only
constitutional challenges to the fee-limitation statute are al-
lowed in federal courts.37 Unlike other administrative agencies,
VA claim benefit decisions are final and unreviewable by any
court.38
Suit was initiated against the Administrator of the VA, the
VA itself, the Director of the San Francisco regional VA office,
and the United States of America. A nationwide preliminary in-
junction restraining the enforcement of the fee-limitation was is-
sued by the district court, and defendants appealed directly to
the Supreme Court. 9
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION
Plaintiffs' application for preliminary injunctive relief was
granted by the district court.4 0 Under the standards adopted in
the ninth circuit, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must estab-
lish either "a combination of probable success and the possibil-
ity of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and
the balance of hardships tips sharply in [plaintiffs'] favor.""
34. The difficulty in establishing a complex claim can be seen in Orville Kelly's case.
Kelly, a founder of the National Association of Atomic Veterans, finally received VA
benefits for service related radiation exposure after seven years of wrangling. Seven
months later he died. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 24 at 1. Of 2,067 radiation-related
veterans' claims in 1983, all but 14 were denied. Id. at 14.
35. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3183.
36. Id. See Complaint For Declarative and Injunctive Relief, Appendix at 18, Wal-
ters (No. 84-571).
37. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974)(district courts have jurisidiction to hear
constitutional attacks on the VA under 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), but no jurisdiction to review
administrative decisions of the VA in administering statutory benefits, Id. at 366-74).
38. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) providing that decisions of the VA on any question of
fact or law are final. No court has jurisdiction to review such decisions. Devine v. Cle-
land, 616 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rowin, 550 F. Supp. 643 (W.D.N.Y.
1982)(the purpose of § 211(a) is to prevent claims from crowding the federal courts and
to insure equal nationwide application of VA benefits).
39. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West 1984), infra note 101.
40. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302 (1984).
41. Id. at 1307 (quoting William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont. Baking Co.,
19861
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The traditional standard4 2 applied by the district court required
that the court examine the VA claims procedures and the find-
ings of the VA regarding the denial of benefits to plaintiffs.
Whether the VA denial of benefits was constitutional depended
upon the claimants' protected interest, if any, in the benefits. A
denial of a protected interest must meet procedural due process
standards.'3
A. The VA Claims Procedure
Service Connected Death and Disability (SCDD) claims"
are the sole method of redress for veterans against the military
and the government for injuries and disabilities received during
service in the armed forces and which continue to affect and
color their civilian lives after discharge. The Federal Tort
Claims Act 4 ' does not allow suits by members of the armed
Inc., 526 F. 2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1976) and Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F. 2d
953, 954 (2d Cir. 1973)).
42. The standard of balancing hardships was considered uncertain by the Court in
light of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), and Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). In Lyons an injunction did not issue because there was no
real and immediate injury. The use of choke-holds, sought to be enjoined, could not be
established as a future injury to petitioner. In Romero the Court looked to whether the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act allowed for equitable remedies. The reasoning of
these cases might be used to disallow such equitable remedies for plaintiffs in district
court unless such a remedy is specifically authorized by statute, which it is not.
43. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976). The Court in Goldberg upheld the right of a welfare recipient to a hearing
before welfare benefits were terminated. The Court later, in Mathews, used a balancing
test in determining that when the benefit decision is amenable to determination on writ-
ten medical reports, and where the benefit is not the sole source of livelihood (as with
welfare payments), it is not wrong for a court to consider the possibility that benefit
awards might be threatened by increased administrative costs. The Court was similarly
influenced by the use of written medical reports in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
See also supra notes 116 and 122.
44. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-14.
For disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in
line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease con-
tracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval, or air service, during a pe-
riod of war, the United States will pay to any veteran thus disabled and who was
discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable from the period
of service in which said injury or disease was incurred, or preexisting injury or
disease was aggravated, compensation as provided in this subchapter, but no
compensation shall be paid if the disability is the result of the veteran's own
wilful misconduct.
Id. at § 310.
45. 28 U.S.C.A §§ 2671-80. The exemption claimed in § 2680(j) bars "[any claim
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forces,' 6 and discharged veterans are prohibited from appealing
VA claims decisions in federal courts.
Claimants must "submit evidence sufficient to justify a be-
lief in a fair and impartial mind that [the] claim is well
grounded.'4 The existence of the disability must be proved,'49
and the disability must be "service-related. '5 0
There exist fifty-eight regional VA offices where SCDD
claims may be made. A VA rating panel" determines initially if
a claim is valid, then applies a "schedule""2 of benefits, and is-
sues a Notification of Decision (ND). Claimants may challenge
an adverse ND by filing a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) within
one year5 ' with the VA. The VA may reverse its original ND or
proceed to prepare a Statement of the Case (SOC).5 5 Claimants
arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast
Guard, during time of war."
46. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
47. 38 U.S.C.A § 211(a) provides that the Veterans Administrator's decision:
on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the VA providing
benefits . . . shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of
the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by
an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
See also Durant v. United States, 749 F. 2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1985)(alleged denial of a
property interest by VA claims procedure was insufficient to circumvent 38 U.S.C.A. §
211(a)).
48. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1985).
49. Under the wartime disability compensation scheme, there is a presumption of a
veteran's sound condition, 38 U.S.C.A. § 311 (West 1979)(Certain other presumptions
relate to certain diseases and disabilities, id. at § 312), which is rebuttable. Id. at § 313.
See also 38 C.F.R. § 3102 (1985).
50. 38 U.S.C.A. § 310 (1986). See supra note 44; 38 C.F.R. § 3.301-14 (1986) espe-
cially § 3.311b, claims based on exposure to ionizing radiation (50 Fed. Reg. 34458, Aug.
26, 1985) enacted after the Court's decision in Walters; see also Hochstein, Hope for
Atomic Vets: The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure and Ju-
dicial Review Act, 4 ANTIOCH L. J. 235 (1986).
51. Rating panels generally include medical, legal and occupational specialists, all
employed by the VA. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp.
1302, 1318 (N.D.Cal. 1984).
52. 38 U.S.C.A. § 314, Rates of wartime disability compensation; 38 C.F.R. § 3.321,
General rating considerations; 38 U.S.C. § 355 and 38 C.F.R. Part 4 (1986), Schedule for
rating disabilities.
53. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(e)(1985). "The most common ND is a very brief computer no-
tice" denying a claim. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1318.
54. 38 C.F.R. § 19.129 (1985). Failure to file an NOD results in a final decision by
default.
55. 38 C.F.R. § 19.120(1985). An SOC contains summaries of: (1) the evidence, (2) the
law, and (3) a determination by the agency of original jurisdiction of each issue and the
reasons behind the determinations.
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must then file a Substantive Appeal within sixty days of the
SOC, or within the remaining one year time period from the
ND.50 Claimants are "presumed to be in agreement with any
statement of fact contained in the Statement of the Case to
which no exception is taken."' 7 The Board of Veterans Appeals
(BVA) in Washington, D.C., next reviews the regional board's
decision." Decisions by the BVA are final59 and cannot be re-
viewed by any court."
In the present case, the individual veterans and service or-
ganizations argued that attorney representation was necessary
for claimants from the very beginning of the claims procedure
process."' They contend that the right to retain counsel would
increase the fairness of the administrative procedure, reduce the
possibility of an erroneous denial of benefits, and more closely
follow the congressional purpose in establishing benefits for vet-
erans.6" The effectiveness of a veteran's presentation of a com-
plex case before a VA hearing board is limited when, as usually
happens, a veteran does not utilize the right to a personal hear-
ing from the very beginning of the claims process. 3 This right is
underutilized in simple and complex64 cases. Further, what assis-
56. 38 C.F.R. § 19.129(b) and Rule 45 § 19.145 (1985).
57. 38 C.F.R. § 19.121(b)(3) (1985). See 38 C.F.R. § 19.123(a)(1985) requiring the
Substantive Appeal to set out specific allegations of error in fact or in law.
58. 38 C.F.R. § 19.121(b)(5) (1985).
59. 38 C.F.R. § 19.104 (1985). Allegations of error of law or fact or the submission of
new evidence will reopen a claim.
60. 38 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) claims procedures before the VA are different from other
administrative agency procedures, e.g., claimants for social security benefits "may obtain
a review of such [administrative decision] by a civil action ...in the district court of
the United States for the judicial district in which.the plaintiff resides." 42 U.S.C.A. §
405 (g). Exhausting administrative remedies is the only path for veterans claiming bene-
fits unless a constitutional challenge is made against the VA decision.
61. Appellees' Motion to Affirm, Walters (No. 84-571). "Actual adjudicative policies
and practices often markedly diverge from C.F.R. requirements." Id. at 11. "Over 800
V.A. staff attorneys decide claims, prepare ratings and SOCs, draft B.V.A. opinions, and
perform a host of other functions in the adjudicative process." Id. at 16.
62. The congressional purpose behind the statutes under attack was "to protect vet-
erans from extortionate fees for more clerical assistance." Smith v. United States, 83 F.
2d 631, 640 (8th Cir. 1936) quoted in Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1323 n.20 (N.D. Cal.
1984). A proposed bill to provide for limited judicial review of B.V.A. decisions did not
propose removing the fee limitations. S. REP. No. 97-466, 97th Cong., Sess. 50 (1982). See
Walters, 105 S. Ct. 3180, n.3 at 3210 (1985)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Brief for Petitioner at 11-13, Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,
(No. 85-571).
64. Justice Rehnquist found that the district court never expressly defined what it
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tance a veteran receives from service representatives is limited
because many of these representatives are greatly overworked."
This reduction in the effectiveness of a veteran's presentation is
encountered in all hearings, be it a local hearing or an appeal to
the national office of Veterans Appeals.
The complexity of the VA procedures may handicap a
claimant in obtaining benefits." Although a veteran may intro-
duce any evidence and raise any argument, 7 the hearings are
non-adversarial 8 and cross-examination of witnnesses is prohib-
ited. The VA's "obligation" is twofold: to assist the claimant in
developing the case, and "to render a decision which grants [the
claimant] every benefit that can be supported in law while pro-
tecting the interests of the government."" Veterans organiza-
meant by a "complex" case. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3186. The VA procedures for the
majority of benefit claims were too abstractly analyzed to deserve to be described as
"complex," id. at 3193, and radiation exposure claims are such a small percentage of
total claims that they are not complex "by any fair definition of that term ... because]
the medical examination reveals no disability". Id. at 3194. Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence also noted that complex cases were not defined adequately, but noted that if there
is a distinct group of cases that differ "in important respects from the typical" benefit
claim, a different claims process might be required. Id. at 3198.
65. Supra note 64 at 11 n.6.
66. The VA, through a "record purpose disallowance," may disallow a benefit claim if
a claimant fails to submit, within a specified time limit, requested evidence necessary to
complete his application. This is so whether or not the claimant has been furnished with
notice of such time limit or the necessary forms and information for completion of the
claim application. 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(1985). Additionally, if evidence requested in order to
reopen a benefit claim is not furnished by the claimant within one year after the date of
request, the claim will be considered abandoned. Under such circumstances, no further
action will be taken by the VA until a new claim is received. 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(a) (1985).
The district court also found that the VA "discourages" applicants from pressing for
hearings and "encourages" applicants to waive certain hearings. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at
1321.
67. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(b), § 19.172 (1985).
68. 38 C.F.R. § 19.157 (1985), Rule 57(c), Nonadversary Proceedings.
Hearings conducted by and for the Board are ex parte in nature and non-adver-
sarial. Parties to the hearing will be permitted to ask questions of all witnesses
but cross-examination will not be permitted. Proceedings will not be limited by
legal rules of evidence, but reasonable bounds of relevancy and materiality will
be maintained.
69. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103a (1985) (emphasis added). The VA argued that the govern-
ment's interest was to keep administrative proceedings non-adversarial, thereby reducing
administrative costs, and to insure that veterans received the benefits, not unscrupulous
attorneys. Claimants argued that allowing the payment of reasonable attorney's fees
would not conflict with any government interest. Save for the "obligation" of the govern-
ment, the regulation does not state what the government interest is.
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tions may provide representation for claimants,"° but once uti-
lized for presenting a claim such representation precludes, by
statute, representation by an attorney.71 Veterans, therefore,
have the option of presenting claims with the assistance of un-
paid service representatives, the assistance of an attorney who
cannot charge more than ten dollars, or with no help, represent-
ing themselves pro se.
B. The Due Process Right
The right to procedural due process under the fifth amend-
ment applies to all protected property interests of an individ-
ual.72 The district court found inherent in 38 U.S.C. § 310 and §
312 7 "an absolute right to benefits to qualified individuals. '74
Not only do present recipients of veterans benefits have a prop-
erty iiterest in the continued receipt of benefits, but first-time
veteran applicants likewise have a protected property interest in
receiving benefits. 75 The Supreme Court has held that a pro-
tected property interest is created by statute for recipients of
welfare, 76 social security,77 and veterans educational benefits;78
70. Service organization representation is regulated under 38 C.F.R. § 14.626 (1985).
The purpose of regulation of representatives is to assure that claimants have qualified
representation in the preparation, presentation, and prosecution of claims for veterans'
benefits. See also 38 C.F.R. § 14.634 (1985) which provides no fee for service organization
representation of a veteran's claim, while sections 14.626-29 do not require the represen-
tative to be an attorney (in fact most are not attorneys).
71. 38 C.F.R. § 14.631(c) (1985). Only one organization, agent, or representative will
be recognized at one time in the prosecution of a claim for one specific benefit.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
73. 38 U.S.C. § 310 and § 321:
For disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted
in the line of duty. . . the United States will pay to any veteran. . . compensa-
tion as provided in this subchapter. The surviving spouse, child or children and
dependent parent or parents . . . shall be entitled to receive compensation.
74. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1312.
75. The district court reasoned that previous cases on the fee-limitation, Gendron v.
Saxbe, 389 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd per curiam sub nom., Gendron v. Levi,
423 U.S. 802 (1975) and Demarest v. United States, 718 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1983), were
not dispositive of the due process claim of a protected property interest, Gendron having
a "sparse" set of facts and Demarest attacking the statute as "facially" unconstitutional
on stipulated facts. Both cases are distinguished from the present case in which fuller
discovery was anticipated at a trial on the merits.
76. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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while lower courts have also ruled that a protected property in-
terest is created for applicants of rent subsidies,79 general re-
lief,80 disabled child annuities under the Railway Retirement
Act," social security,82 supplemental social security income," in-
mate claims for injuries while employed in prison,84 and appli-
cants for admission to the bar.8
The district court's analysis8" focused on the statutorily cre-
ated right to press SCDD claims before the VA, veterans contin-
ued expectation of congressional concern for veterans per se and
the fact that claimants satisfying the VA requirements are enti-
tled to benefits. 7 The flexible88 elements of due process which
the district court examined included: (1) the private interest af-
fected by the VA action; (2) the probability of deprivation of
that interest through error because of the process used; and (3)
the government's or VA's interest involved, both fiscal and
administrative.
Looking to other processes involving important individual
interests89 and the ability of individuals to assert rights to bene-
fits pro se, the district court concluded that plaintiffs "demon-
strated a high probability of success"9 on the merits at trial and
also demonstrated that the fee-limitation statute creates a seri-
ous risk of depriving claimants of their statutorily created pro-
77. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
78. Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080 (1980).
79. Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982).
80. Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1970) cert. denied sub noma., Peer v.
Griffeth, 445 U.S. 970 (1980).
81. Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Board, 625 F.2d 486 (3rd Cir. 1980).
82. Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978).
83. Shaw v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 268 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
84. Davis v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Kan. 1976).
85. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
86. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1313. The court recognized that the "property interest
in a benefit must be grounded in 'a legitimate claim of entitlement' which is 'more than
an abstract need or desire for it' or 'a unilateral expectation of it.' " Id. at 1314 (quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
87. 589 F. Supp. at 1313.
88. Id. The test used must take into account all of the particular facts and circum-
stances, as the need for procedural safeguards varies with the situation. Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263-71; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-45.
89. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1316. Thus the Ninth Circuit has ruled that while wel-
fare recipients require counsel when dealing with the state, non-tenured faculty do not.
Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1972).
90. Waiters, 589 F. Supp. at 1322-23.
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tected property interest in SCDD benefits."'
C. The First Amendment Claim 2
The district court concluded that plaintiffs had also estab-
lished a high probability of succeeding on their first amendment
claims at a trial on the merits."3 Any statute that impairs or
chills the first amendment rights of individuals and organiza-
tions can be constitutional only if it serves compelling govern-
ment interests and is narrowly drawn to protect those
interests."
No substantial government interest or harm was threatened
by protecting the individual's or organization's rights to peti-
tion9 5 the VA with freely retained counsel. 6 Thus the VA's "pa-
ternalistic" argument 97 defending the fee-limitation as protect-
ing claimants' benefits from being wasted on attorneys' fees was
rejected by the court as in conflict with the first amendment in
that "people will perceive their own best interests if only they
91. The district court reasoned that as with federal prison employees injured on the
job (see Davis v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Kan. 1976)), the veterans have a
claim authorized by statute and regulations for disabilities that may destroy their future
earnings potential in society. The importance of this interest to the claimant and the
continued belief that Congress will provide such compensation to disabled veterans es-
tablish the property interest at stake. As in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (wel-
fare recipients have a statutory entitlement which is more than an expectation), the vet-
erans' benefits statutes establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to benefits which, if
the veteran meets the requirements, must be given to the veteran. The procedural due
process requirements of the hearing established that the personal interest was substan-
tial, that the present VA procedures were complex and fraught with inadvertant claim
denial, and that no government interest would be sacrificed by altering the hearing pro-
cess to allow claimants to pay attorneys more than ten dollars.
92. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1323.
93. Id. at 1327. The first amendment claims of the plaintiffs include the right to peti-
tion for redress of grievances and the right to meaningfully exercise the right to petition.
The complex procedures of the VA assure that plaintiff's right to press a claim is mean-
ingless without expert legal assistance. Intertwined in this argument is the first amend-
ment right to freedom of association.
94. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1973); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432-
33 (1978). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-23, 44-45 (1976).
95. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1326: "[Tlhe right to petition ensures meaningful access
to administrative agencies, as well as to courts." The district court found it "particularly
crucial" in VA hearings.
96. Id. at 1325 (quoting California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972)).
97. Id. at 1327, suggesting that methods should be found to protect both property
interests and first amendment rights.
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are well enough informed."' 8 The court concluded that the VA
SCDD claims procedures were complex and the inability of orga-
nizations or individuals adequately to press a claim established
the plaintiffs' probability of ultimate success on the merits at
trial." The district court issued a nationwide preliminary in-
junction, precluding enforcement of the fee-limitation statute
against claimants or their attorneys.100
IV. DIRECT APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
A. Jurisdiction
The VA filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1252.101 Originally, § 1252 provided for a direct appeal
to the Supreme Court when the decision is "against the constitu-
tionality of any Act of Congress. "102 In 1937 the statute was
amended to require that the Supreme Court hear such a case or
controversy,103 and to expedite the appeal of court rulings on
New Deal legislation.0 " Appeal is available if the United States,
or an agency or officer, was a party to the lower court proceed-
98. Id. (quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). The Court concluded in the Virginia case that keep-
ing consumers in ignorance of lawful prices was prohibited by the first amendment. The
paternalistic approach of Virginia is analogous to the VA's position. In asserting that it
will tell the VA claimant what he or she needs to know to protect the benefit claim, the
VA is precluding the use of a better system: let the claimant pursue the information
needed.
99. Walters, 589 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
100. Id. at 1329.
101. Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final
judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States. . . holding any Act
of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the
United States or any of its agencies . . . or Officer . . .is a party.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West 1964).
102. Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 881 n.13 (1984).
103. Sen. Hugo L. Black, sponsor of the bill, stated:
I see no reason why. . . we should not say to the Supreme Court, "...[ilt
is not for you to determine whether you will take the case or not. Those who are
charged primarily with enforcing the law in this country are bound to be in close
contact with the necessity for a speedy decision than you are in your court room,
and they have determined that this is a case of such great national moment and
importance that it must be decided at once."
Appeals from Federal Courts, Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 2176, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 20 (1935), quoted in Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870,
881 (1984).
104. Heckler, 465 U.S. at 881 n.15.
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ing. The policy behind § 1252 appeals is to allow quick Supreme
Court review of lower court determinations on the unconstitu-
tionality of any act of Congress. The Court was divided as to the
finality of the preliminary injunction and as to the proper stan-
dard of review.
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Rehnquist,
perceived § 1252 to be an "exception to the policy . . . of mini-
mizing the mandatory docket"'' 0 of the Court. He characterized
as "semantic" the distinction between a lower court holding a
statute unconstitutional, and ordering a preliminary injunction
enjoining enforcement of a statute based on the probability of
likely success in establishing the statute's unconstitutionality at
a trial on the merits. "This Court's appellate jurisdiction does
not turn on such semantic niceties."'06 Calling the problem
raised by such distinctions a "red herring,' ' 07 the Court found
that the nationwide preliminary injunction issued by the district
court frustrated the will of Congress embodied in the fee-limita-
tion statute,'08 and thus invoked the congressional purpose be-
hind § 1252109 mandating that the Supreme Court hear a direct
appeal to speed the final determination of the restraint placed
on the government.
The preliminary injunction issued by the district court envi-
sioned fuller development of the facts through extensive discov-
ery. Justice Rehnquist found the precedential effect of McLucas
v. Champlain" to be dispositive, and interpreted § 1252 as ap-
plying to interlocutory judgments and final judgments, not just
105. Waiters, 105 S. Ct. at 3187 (citing McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21, 30
(1975)).
106. Id. The codification in 1948 of § 1252 took place without comment. The opinion
of the Court is that such a change does not therefore alter the scope of § 1252 Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction. Justice Brennan's dissent strongly urged that the nation-
wide "scope" of the district court's preliminary injunction is immaterial and that § 1252
appellate jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the lower court determination which
must be that the statute is in fact unconstitutional. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3188, 3204
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 3187.
108. Justice Rehnquist looked to the original § 1252 act which allowed Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction cover decisions "against the Constitutionality of any Act of
Congress." Act of August 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 2, 50 Stat. 752. Waiters, 105 S. Ct. at 3187-
88, 3188 n.7.
109. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3188.
110. 421 U.S. 21 (1975).
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to interlocutory final judgments and other final judgments.
Therefore, even without the contemplated discovery, an appeal
under § 1252 "brings before us not only the constitutional ques-
tion, but the whole case.""'
Justice Brennan's dissent "strongly" disagreed with this
analysis of § 1252. "We have never in the 48 year history of
§ 1252 assumed jurisdiction where the District Court had done
no more than simply determine that there was a 'likelihood' of
unconstitutionality sufficient to support temporary relief pend-
ing a final decision on the merits.""' 2 The difference between a
preliminary injunction and a final determination on the merits,
the dissent stated, is not a semantic difference."'
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor upheld the § 1252
appellate jurisdiction for a review of the district court's possible
abuse of discretion in granting the injunction. Finding abuse of
discretion, the concurrence states that "the fee-limitation must
pose a risk of erroneous deprivation of rights to the generality of
cases reached" by the injunction."' If there exists a "discrete
class of complex cases", however, it might be possible to "[carve]
out a subclass of complex claims that by their nature require
111. McLucas, 421 U.S. at 32. In McLucas, Justice Powell cited United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), a Brennan decision on a § 1252 appeal from a Georgia federal
district court. In Raines the federal government charged the Terrel County Board of
Registrars with racial discrimination in registering black voters. The Georgia district
court denied the government an injunction against the Board, and before hearing the
case ruled the law under which the action was brought (Civil Rights Act of 1957) uncon-
stitutional. Brennan's majority opinion that "the basis of the decision below in fact was
that the act of congress was unconstitutional" Raines, 362 U.S. at 20, and Frankfurter's
concurring opinion that "the weighty presumptive validity with which the [Act of Con-
gress]. . . comes here is not overborne by any claim urged against it", id. at 28, is echoed
in this Court's decision, although the jurisdictional appeal question in Raines was post-
poned by the Supreme Court until a hearing on the constitutional merits before the
Court. United States v. Raines, 360 U.S. 926 (1959).
112. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3203.
113. The mischaracterization of the district court decision on preliminary relief as a
holding that the fee-limitation is unconstitutional will have many revolutionary reper-
cussions according to Brennan's dissent. Because § 1252 could apply to "any court of the
United States," would every and any court decision on a motion that is "against the
constitutionality of a federal statute" be appealable directly to the Supreme Court? How
is this to further the purpose of § 1252 which the dissent understands to require a fully
developed record in the court below, or a fully developed record before the Supreme
Court, as in Raines, to allow a determination of the constitutionality of the challenged
statute. Id. at 3200-01. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 3197.
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expert assistance. . . to assure the veterans a hearing appropri-
ate to the nature of the case."11 On remand it then appears that
the district court is free to decide if any cases meet the stan-
dards established in the opinion."1 6
To the dissenting justices the concurrence of Justice
O'Connor was better than the interpretation of § 1252 by Justice
Rehnquist, but was still in error. The abuse of discretion stan-
dard is for the courts of appeal, not for the Supreme Court
under § 1252. Justice Brennan would vacate the lower court de-
cision and remand the case for the filing of a new district court
decision, permitting the VA to appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, under the abuse of discretion standard.11 7
Before hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court stayed
the district court injunction." 8 In granting the stay, Justice
Rehnquist called the presumption of constitutionality not
''merely a factor to be considered in evaluating success on the
merits, but an equity to be considered in favor of the govern-
ment in balancing hardships.""' Having the case before it, the
Court then proceeded to determine whether the fee-limitation
statute was in fact unconstitutional.
B. Due Process and the Fee-Limitation
The Supreme Court was unconvinced by the district court's
analysis of the standard to be applied in due process challenges
to congressional statutes.'20 Deferring to congressional judg-
ment,'"' and requiring that the due process risk of erroneous
115. Id. at 3198. Justice O'Conner found it difficult to evaluate the claims in the
present posture of the case, based on a record developed only at a preliminary injunction
stage. Id.
116. Id. at 3198 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 615-16 (1979)).
117. Id. at 3209.
118. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 468 U.S. 1323 (1984).
119. Id. at 1324.
120. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The standard to be applied to
procedural due process cases enunciated in Mathews was only "purportedfly]" followed
by the lower court. The standard is (1) the private interest affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used
considering the value of a different procedure; and (3) the government's interest in a
different procedure. The due process requirement is for an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful manner and at a meaningful time.
121. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3189-90. The court cites McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 401-02 (1819), and Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349, in finding congressional
[Vol. IV
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outcome be applied to the generality of cases," the Court re-
jected precedents relied upon in the lower court opinion,2 3 while
giving "great weight"" to the government's interest 125 involved
in preserving the fee-limitation statute.
The congressional purpose in enacting the fee-limitation
statute was to protect the full-value of a claimant's benefit
award. 26 As the VA SCDD claim procedures were designed by
Congress to be non-adversarial12 7 and to obligate the VA to read
all the evidence in a light most favorable to the claimant before
awarding a benefit,2 8 "legislatures are to be allowed considera-
ble leeway to formulate such processes without being forced to
conform to a rigid constitutional code of procedural necessi-
ties."'29 The district court's assertion of the government's "pa-
commitment to the fee-limitation. The fee-limitation law is 122 years old and in January
1985, before oral argument was heard, there remained two bills proposed in Congress to
alter the fee-structure which had not been acted upon.
122. 105 S. Ct. at 3189 n.1. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344, and Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 612-13 (1979). The application of the Mathews test, see supra note 120, to the
medical claims of veterans was influenced by the Court's Parham decision. In Parham, a
three judge federal district court had ruled unconstitutional a Georgia law allowing par-
ents to voluntarily admit minor children to mental hospitals without a hearing with
guardians ad litem. The Court reversed and remanded, stating that "illusory protection
of an adversarial proceeding" would intrude into the parent-child relationship. Because
the questions concerning commitment were medical, the Court only emphasized that a
neutral fact finder should determine the minor's need for commitment and the fact
finder should utilize all the traditional information such doctors rely on. "That there
may be risks of error in the process affords no rational predicate for holding unconstitu-
tional an entire statutory and administrative scheme that is generally followed in thirty
states." 442 U.S. at 612.
123. 105 S. Ct. at 3195. "[T]hese precedents are of only tangential relevance."
124. Id. at 3192. "[U]nder the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis great weight must be
accorded to the government interest at stake here."
125. The asserted government interest was in preserving a non-adversarial proceed-
ing with low administrative costs which when combined with the fee-limitation law en-
sures the protection of veterans and their benefits. In Parham, the Court recognized
Georgia's interest in not imposing procedural obstacles that might discourage the men-
tally ill minors' families from seeking the child's commitment, or from requiring a time
consuming preadmission procedure that would disrupt the work of the institution.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-06.
126. Waiters, 105 S. Ct. at 3190.
127. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1985)
128. Id. "When after careful consideration of all procurable and assembled data, a
reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin, the degree of disability or any other
point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant."
129. Waiters, 105 S. Ct. at 3192. In the context of a procedural due process attack,
the Mathews test convinced the Court that a flexible approach to alternative dispute
resolutions was not defeated by the statistical results of whether or not a veteran had an
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ternalistic" role was deemed to be out of date.1"' The claims
processed through the informal procedures of the VA rarely turn
on a question of law.' Admittance to the VA proceedings of a
paid advocate, while not only frustrating congressional intent in
safeguarding a veteran's total benefit award, would also eventu-
ally frustrate the informal and non-adversarial nature of the VA
procedures. 3 2 Analogizing from rulings on probation s and
prison disciplinary procedures,'34 the Court feared an alteration
of the very fabric of the present VA claim hearing:
It is scarcely open to doubt that if claimants were
permitted to retain compensated attorneys the day might
come when it could be said that an attorney might in-
deed be necessary to present a claim properly in a system
rendered more adversary and more complex by the very
presence of lawyer representation. 3 '
The statistics (despite their unfinished and tentative na-
ture) presented by plaintiff claimants in the lower court' s3 con-
vinced the Court that the presence of attorneys made no differ-
ence to the actual outcome of a veteran's claim. Chastising the
lower court's analysis, 37 the Court doubted that a pro bono at-
attorney to press a claim. Id. at 3196. To defeat the fee-limitation the Court wanted an
"extraordinary strong showing of probability of error" with the present system. Id. at
3192. Of course, by ruling that the fee-limitation was constitutional as applied, the abil-
ity to present contradicting evidence in any court is problematical. The tentative nature
of the statistics in the district court convinced that court to look at other military-type
attorney representation statistics. See id. at 3192-93.
130. See 589 F. Supp. at 1323. But see Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3190 (citing Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) as an example of a by-passed era when "rational paternal-
ism" was condemned).
131. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3194.
132. See supra note 68.
133. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1983).
134. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).
135. Walters, 105 S. Ct at 3192. See also Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 1267 (1975). "Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure
the truth is ascertained but to advance his client's cause by any ethical means." Id. at
1288.
136. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3183, 3192-3 and 589 F. Supp. 1302 at 1316-17. The dis-
trict court found the statistics unhelpful because the success rates of unpaid attorneys
take no account of the development of attorney expertise in a particular area of law.
137. Id. at 3193. The Court found the lower court's analysis "unconvincing" and
quite lacking in the "deference which ought to be shown by any federal court in evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of an Act of Congress." Id. The Court states that "jilt is not
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torney presenting a claim before the VA did anything but his
best to push the client's claim. The lower court had determined
that the success rates of individuals in discharge review hearings
before military boards38 were more reliable to show the effect of
attorneys on the outcome of a hearing than the statistics availa-
ble on attorneys representing claimants before the VA.'
Thus, in the Court's opinion, the "substantial safeguards"' 4 0
of the VA procedures, the non-adversarial' 4 ' and simple nature
of the hearing, and the obligation imposed on the VA by statute
to be responsive to the claim, combine with a lack of substantial
evidence showing any great disparity in representation with or
without an attorney, to tip the balance in favor of the govern-
ment's interest of excluding attorneys who are paid more than
ten dollars for their services. Finding VA benefits more like so-
cial security benefits than welfare payments, 42 in that the bene-
fits are not granted on a basis of need, the non-adversarial pro-
cess is "determinative of the right to employ counsel."" 3 As no
hearing is required before social security benefits may be tempo-
rarily halted,144 so too no attorney is required to protect the
claim of VA claimants.
for. . . any. . . federal court to invalidate a federal statute by so cavalierly dismissing a
long asserted congressional purpose." Id. at 3190.
138. Ultimate success rates:
Service organizations .......................... 48.28%
Compensated attorneys ....................... 72.73%
589 F. Supp. at 1318.
139. Ultimate success rates:
Service Organization representatives ........ 16.2-16.7%
Non-attorney representatives ................... 15.8%
No representation ............................. 15.2%
Attorney-agent ................................ 18.3%
105 S. Ct. at 3193.
140. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3196.
141. That attorneys work for the VA in preparing claims documents and that veter-
ans do not have the right to hire counsel for more than ten dollars removed the issue of a
procedural due process attack on the fee-limitation statute for Justices Stevens, Bren-
nan, and Marshall, and clearly established the issue as one of first amendment rights. Id.
at 3209-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 3195.
143. Id. at 3196. The Court also states here that the district court abused its discre-
tion in holding "otherwise," thereby confusing the proper nature of the Supreme Court
jurisdictional review under 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
144. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3196.
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C. The First Amendment Rights
The Court's decision made short shrift of the first amend-
ment argument. The Court found "no independent signifi-
cance" 145 in this line of reasoning separate from due process ar-
guments. The Court found "conceptual difficulty"146 with
analogies made to cases where attorneys are already permitted
in the forum.
Meaningful access to the VA hearing process is not denied
and claimants are allowed to make a meaningful presentation. It
is questionable whether there is a first amendment right to pay
counsel, the Court reasoned, and the VA process is a "meaning-
ful alternative" that would have to be absent to find such a
right.147
Justice Stevens' powerful dissent 'a disagreed with the plu-
rality analysis concerning a veteran's meaningful access to the
VA claims procedure. 9 Justice Stevens found the interest in-
volved not to be a property interest in a statutorily enacted right
to benefits, but instead the exercise of the first amendement
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. 150 The
individual's liberty interest is of paramount importance, espe-
cially when the individual is confronting the government:
The priceless heritage of our society is the unrestricted
right of each citizen to think as he will . . . it is not the
function of our Government to keep the citizen from fall-
ing into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the
Government from falling into error. 11
145. Id. at 3197.
146. Id. at 3196.
147. Id. at 3197. The crux of the Court's denial of a procedural due process violation
is that the property interest in veterans' benefits is protected by the procedures used,
especially when combined with the statutory mandate to the VA to assist claimants. The
Court sought to avoid destroying the non-adversarial nature of the process by allowing
attorneys to assist claimants in any but the most idealistically pro bono way. Stevens's
dissent asserts that admitting attorneys to the procedure would not be adding a new
procedure, but establishing a better one. Id. at 3211 n.9.
148. Id. at 3209.
149. The dissent would disagree with the Court's decision in ignoring the possibility
that even though the vast majority of cases may be decided correctly by the VA, the
individuals in those cases that are incorrectly decided have had their liberty infringed.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. I
151. Justice Jackson in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-
43 (1950), quoted in 105 S. Ct. at 3215-16 n.21. The dissent argues that the construction
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The age of the fee-limitation statute works against it,"62 for
lawyers, "as skilled communicators dedicated to the service of
their clients,' 1 53 would not introduce new procedures to the
claims process, but only use the existing procedures more effec-
tively. "As conscientious able advocates of the claimant's rights,
the costs of the VA claims procedure should not rise either."'54
It is this liberty interest, upheld in other contexts 55 and previ-
ously confirmed by the Court 5 6 that inflames 5 7 the dissent. Any
of the federal government itself into the different branches and different states indicates
the importance "in protecting individual liberty from the possible misuse of power by a
transient unrestrained majority." Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3215 n. 20. The dissent uses
"paternalistic" five times to describe the government's interest in the present VA proce-
dures. Id. at 3209, 3211, 3211 n.10, 3212 n.10, 3212, and 3215. This view of liberty is
consistent with the Stevens' dissent in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976): "If
man were a creature of the State, the [Court's] analysis would be correct. But neither the
Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty which the Due Process
Clause protects."
152. As in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), where the duration of the condition complained of gave no support to
any present justification of the condition, the fee-limitation statute is undermined by
changing levels of pay through 122 years. The equivalent value of $10.00 in 1864, Stevens
found, was $580.00 today. 105 S. Ct. at 3210.
153. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3212.
154. In Stevens's opinion "the bureaucratic interest in minimizing the cost of admin-
istration is nothing but a red-herring." Id. at 3211 (echoing Rehnquist's use of the
phrase). Also, "[o]nly if it is assumed that the average lawyer is incompetent or unscru-
pulous can one rationally conclude that the efficiency of the agency's work would be
undermined by allowing counsel to participate whenever a veteran is willing to pay for
his services." Id. at 3212.
155. Situations where lawyers are allowed in the case: Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (welfare recipient entitled to a hearing before termination of benefits with'the
right to representation by counsel); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (appoint-
ment of counsel to parole revocation hearing decided case by case); Caulder v. Durham
Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971) (pub-
lic housing tenant has right to be represented by counsel when threatened with eviction);
Sartain v. S.E.C. 601 F.2D 1366 (9th Cir. 1979) (right to counsel when before the S.E.C.
hearing process); Feinberg v. F.D.I.C., 420 F. Supp. 109 (D.D.C. 1976) (bank official's
right to retain counsel); Crook v. Baker, 584 F.Supp. 1531 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (student's
right to counsel). see also cases supra notes 76-85.
156. In discussing a lawyer's right to solicit business, the Court stated that the cli-
ent's right to seek counsel is protected by the first amendment. In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 426 (1978). Also, the right to seek counsel to petition for redress of grievances is
protected. California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
157. Stevens reaches back to the definition of liberty in the dissent of Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); opens and closes his dissent with: "This Court does not appreci-
ate the value of individual liberty." Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3209, 3216; and quotes Dick in
Shakespeare's King Henry VI, pt. II, Act IV, scene 2, line 72: "The first thing we do, let's
kill all the lawyers," as an equivalent effective result of the Court's decision. Walters,
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balancing of the government's administrative costs with the in-
dividual's "priceless" 58 liberty, must tip toward protecting the
individual. Stevens quotes Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v.
United States:'59 "Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are be-
neficent."1 60 The Court misses the principle.
Over strong dissents, the Court reversed the lower court's
order issuing a nationwide injunction and found the fee-limita-
tion statute constitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision effectively limits veterans to service
representation agents, or to acting pro se, when claiming bene-
fits before the VA. Six justices, including Justice O'Conner and
Justice Blackmun, are listed as concurring in the opinion written
by Justice Rehnquist, though Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion, joined by Justice Blackmun, has a distinctly different
effect on the claims asserted. If all six justices are in total agree-
ment with the Rehnquist opinion, then the fee-limitation statute
is constitutitonal and any new constitutional challenges to it
must fail. But if Justices O'Connor and Blackmun only agree
with the jurisdictional finding of the Rehnquist opinion, then as
the opinion states: "Though the Court concludes that denial of
expert representation is not 'per se unconstitutional'. . . on re-
mand, the District Court is free to and should consider any indi-
vidual claims that [the procedures] did not meet the standards
we have described in this opinion."'"
105 S. Ct. at 3216 n.24.
158. "The value of protecting our liberty from deprivation by the State without due
process of law is priceless." Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 60
(1981) (Stevens J., dissenting).
159. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
160. Id. at 479.
161. Waiters, 105 S. Ct. at 3198. On May 7, 1986, the Federal District Court for the
Northern. District of California, relying on Justice O'Connor's concurrence, certified a
class action on behalf of "Ionizing Radiation Claimants" under FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Na-
tional Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 111 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Cal. 1986). "The
class consists of all past, present and future ionizing radiation claimants who have, or
will have, some form of 'active' claim relating to SCDD benefits before the VA." Id. at
598. Claimants may be able to establish that a radiation caused disability "is, to a consti-
tutionally significant degree, more complex than establishing disability in other cases."
Id. at 606. Evidence submitted with plaintiffs' motion for class certification included:
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May an individual veteran properly mount a constitutional
attack on the statute? To Justice Brennan,"8 2 the answer would
be yes, if the attack is by an individual claimant that the statute
is unconstitutitionsl as applied. Any veteran asserting such a
claim would need the assistance of counsel. Where is the attor-
ney to take on a complex constitutional challenge for a client
who may, in the end, be precluded by law from paying counsel
more than ten dollars?
Until Congress changes the law and establishes some form
of reasonable attorneys fees, VA hearings will continue to be
one-sided proceedings where individuals sacrifice their individ-
ual cases and needs in order for the majority of cases to be inex-
pensively decided. Continuing to battle, veterans now face the
modern foe of fiscal retrenchment backed by a constitutional
reading of congressional intent which contradicts itself and
which in 122 years has been transformed into the opposite of
what it was intended.
This Orwellian interpretation of congressional purpose is
not new for the VA. Under different regulations1 3 the VA cut
off benefits to a veteran's widow, 64 and argued that the court
could not look at any administrative evidence" 5 in making its
decision. Four years later, in a proceeding to recoup an educa-
tional assistance benefit, the VA asserted that the federal court
only had jurisdiction to rule for the VA.'
It is clear that, by statute, the VA must have the veteran's
best interests as heart,1 1 7 but it is not clear that this interest is
Rabinette, Jablon, Preston, Studies of Participants in Nuclear Tests, Final Report I
Sept. 1978 - 31 Oct. 1984; MEDICAL FOLLOW-UP AGENCY, NAT'L RESOURCES COUNCIL at 7
(May 1985) 2101 Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. (approximately 222,000
armed forces personnel involved in announced U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests from 1946-
62); a document from the VA entitled Radiation Exposure Claims, Sept. 3, 1985 (of 5,194
radiation claims, only 79, or 1.5%, were allowed; of Atomic Veterans claims, 3,050 claims
from peaceful A-tests plus 825 claims from Nagasaki and Hiroshima, only 15, or 0.4%
were allowed. See Declaration of Dorothy Legarreta, National Ass'n of Radiation Survi-
vors v. Alvarez, No. C 83-1861 MHP (N.D. Cal. April 28, 1986). Trial is set for Septem-
ber 1, 1987, on the class action challenge to the fee-limitation statute.
162. Id. at 3207 n.37.
163. 38 U.S.C. § 3503(a): Benefit forfeiture because of fraud.
164. de Magno v. United States, 636 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
165. Id. at 717-20.
166. United States v. Brandon, 584 F. Supp. 803, 804 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
167. 38 C.F.R. § 19.157(c). The hearings before the B.V.A. are nonadversarial and not
bound by legal rules of evidence, though ex parte in nature. In local hearings reasonable
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acted upon or followed through, by the VA. 6 ' They also serve
who file claims and are denied benefits.
Possible challenges to the fee-limitation statute still exist.
The government might not prosecute an attorney for receiving
an eleven dollar fee for representing an attorney, and if not,
where would the line be drawn? The penalty section of the stat-
ute might be unconstitutional. Without the criminal sanctions
the fee-limitation is meaningless, but where is the attorney will-
ing to risk a career for those who risked their lives?
The VA claims procedures appear to be ripe for the utiliza-
tion of law students in law school clinics. Combined with a
course on Administrative Law, the application of student inter-
est with funding through an educational endeavor might be able
to overcome the expenses involved in developing extensive medi-
cal reports, calling for hearings at every adminstrative level, and
generally protecting the rights which many veterans do not
know they have. 69
doubt regarding the origin, degree of disability, or "any other point," is to be resolved in
the veteran claimant's favor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1986). Decisions are to be based on the
facts, with "due consideration to the policy of the Veterans Administration to administer
the law under a broad and liberal interpretation .... " 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (1986).
"[E]mployees in the Veterans Administration shall maintain the highest possible stan-
dards of honesty, integrity, impartiality, and conduct." 38 C.F.R. § 0.735-1 (1986); Stan-
dards of Ethical Conduct, 38 C.F.R. § 0.735-10 (1986); Attitude of rating officers, 38
C.F.R. § 4.23 (1986).
168. In January, 1987, Federal District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel "imposed
about $115,000 in penalties" against the VA for willfully destroying documents; the doc-
uments are necessary for plaintiffs to continue the constitutional challenge to the appli-
cability of the fee limitation in complex cases. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1987 at Al, col. 1. The
penalties imposed covered plaintiffs' legal fees "plus $15,000 that will be placed in a fund
used to pay lawyer-interns at the Federal District Court" in San Francisco. Id. at A15,
col. 1. Judge Patel ordered a special master to oversee the VA's effort to establish an
internal procedure to assure the non-destruction of discovery material, Id. See also 38
C.F.R. § 1.17. Evaluation of studies relating to health effects of dioxin and radiation
exposure (50 Fed. Reg. 34458, Aug. 26, 1985). One of the factors to be considered in
evaluating scientific studies is "(4) Whether the study's findings are applicable to the
veteran population of interest." Id.
169. Legal interns, law students and paralegals must be under the direct supervi-
sion of a recognized attorney. . . in order to prepare cases before the Board of
Veterans Appeals. These individuals may present oral arguments at hearings
only if the recognized attorney is present. Otherwise, such individuals must
qualify as agents or representatives under Rule 53 or 54 (§ 19.153 or 19.154).
38 C.F.R. § 19.156 (1986). See also 38 C.F.R. § 19.154 (1986): "Any competent person
may be recognized as a representative for a particular claim, unless that person has been
barred from practice before the Veterans Administration."
COMMENTS
The congressional concern for, and protection of, federal
benefits recipients may also be extended to other procedures and
agencies. To protect social security disability income recipients,
Congress might limit the amount 70 an attorney can charge a
claimant for representation to twenty-five dollars. Surely, this
too could be backed by statutory mandates to have the claim-
ant's best interests at heart. Any lower court decision "against"
this magnanimous congressional purpose on constitutional
grounds will instantly be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
The bitterness that veterans feel toward this type of process
is reflected in the amicus briefs:
It is ironic and unfair that veterans (and their spouses
and dependents), who staked their lives and health in
fighting to preserve the Bill of Rights and its guarantee
of legal counsel which it protects for virtually all others,
are denied the right to choose and use legal counsel to
help them obtain the statutory benefits Congress in-
tended them to have. 7
1
What was all the fighting about, anyway?
Michael J. Burns
170. Courts have interpreted dollar amounts in statutes in different ways. Recently, a
local criminal court judge ruled that while the bright line for determining defendant's
right to a jury trial is whether the maximum sentence is six months or $500.00 fine, the
six months is fixed, while the $500.00 line is so old and low, that a crime with a maxi-
mum fine of $1,000.00 still does not imply that a defendant receives a jury trial. People
v. Cruz, 129 Misc.2d 235, 492 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Bronx Crim. Ct. 1985).
171. Amicus Curiae Brief, American Veterans Committee at 16, Walters v. National
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (No. 84-571).
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